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                                            Object Persistence in Philosophy and Psychology   
      BRIAN J.         SCHOLL                       
    Abstract  :           What makes an object the same persisting individual over time? Philosophers 
and psychologists have both grappled with this question, but from different perspectives  —
  philosophers conceptually analyzing the criteria for object persistence, and psychologists 
exploring the mental mechanisms that lead us to experience the world in terms of 
persisting objects. It is striking that the same themes populate explorations of persistence 
in these two very different ﬁ  elds  —  e.g. the roles of spatiotemporal continuity, persistence 
through property change, and cohesion violations. Such similarities may reﬂ  ect  an 
underlying connection, in that psychological mechanisms of object persistence (especially 
relevant parts of mid-level visual object processing) may serve to underlie the intuitions 
about persistence that fuel metaphysical theories. This would be a way for cognitive 
science to join these two disparate ﬁ  elds, helping to explain the possible origins and 
reliability of some metaphysical intuitions, and perhaps leading to philosophical progress.       
    1. Introduction: Perceiving Persisting Objects 
  Among the most important discoveries of cognitive science has been the realization 
that most seemingly obvious and effortless mental tasks  —  e.g. recognizing faces and 
understanding speech  —  actually result from complex feats of cognitive processing. 
Our minds not only meet these challenges but do so in a way that can hide from 
us that there is a challenge being met in the ﬁ  rst place. As a result, many research 
projects in cognitive science begin by pointing to some aspect of our mental lives 
that we typically take completely for granted, and then asking how it is possible. 
This paper is about one such seemingly obvious aspect of our mental lives: our 
experience of the world in terms of persisting objects. 
  Visual processing begins with an undivided wash of unbound features, and results 
in the visual experience of discrete objects and events. Accordingly, a tremendous 
amount of research has explored the principles by which the visual system segments 
images into units. However, visual experience consists of more than individual 
snapshots of the world: we must also bind individual views of objects into dynamic 
representations which persist across time and motion. Without such a computation of 
  persisting   objecthood, visual experience would be incoherent. In recent years, 
psychologists have made great strides in working out the principles that guide the 
construction and maintenance of representations of portions of the visual ﬁ  eld as the 
  same   objects over time, motion, featural change, and interruptions such as occlusion. 
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  Psychological research on object persistence is not isolated to visual perception. 
Indeed, object persistence seems like a true case study in cognitive science, since it 
has been a focus of study in so many different disciplines. In the ﬁ  rst place, questions 
about persistence are not restricted to vision: the same questions arise in the study 
of audition, for example, wherein we can hear multiple melodic contours persist 
over time and frequency changes. In this case each melody can be considered as a 
different auditory   ‘  object  ’   that persists and evolves over time, and researchers have 
studied how the mind binds sounds into these persisting auditory representations 
(see   Bregman, 1990  ). In addition, object persistence has also been studied in the 
context of higher-level cognition, where cognitive psychologists have begun to 
work out the factors that inﬂ  uence our judgments of object persistence (e.g.   Rips, 
Blok and Newman, 2006  ). And persistence is also one of the most well-studied 
phenomena in infant cognition  —  where it has been explored both explicitly in 
studies of infants  ’     ‘  core knowledge  ’   of simple physical principles (e.g.   Cheries, 
Wynn and Scholl, 2006; Spelke  , Kestenbaum, Simons and Wein, 1995;   Xu and 
Carey, 1996  ) and implicitly in studies of numerical cognition (e.g.   Wynn, 1992  ). 
  Beyond these diverse areas of psychology, object persistence has also been a 
focus of exploration in several other ﬁ  elds. Some of these projects are applied in 
nature: for example, computer scientists and engineers have been forced to explore 
real-world issues of object persistence as they construct computer-vision systems 
that can track objects over time  —  cars through trafﬁ  c, or people through crowds 
(for a recent review see   Yilmaz, Javed and Shah, 2006  ). Other projects are 
conceptual in nature: for example, philosophers have long grappled with questions 
and puzzles about object persistence as central challenges in metaphysics (for a 
recent review see   Kurtz, 2006  ). These philosophical investigations will be a focus 
of the present paper. 
    1.1 Linking Philosophical and Psychological Persistence 
  Despite their diverse origins, these many studies of object persistence tend to trafﬁ  c 
in the same underlying questions, answers, and research themes. The primary goal 
of this paper is to highlight such connections between studies of object persistence 
in philosophy and experimental psychology. Research on persistence in these two 
areas has almost always proceeded completely independently (for rare exceptions, 
discussed in Section 5.1, see   Hall, 1998; Rips   et al.  , 2006; Xu, 1997  ), but I suggest 
that the many similarities between these research projects reﬂ  ect an underlying 
connection: psychological mechanisms of object persistence (especially relevant 
parts of mid-level visual object processing) may serve to underlie the intuitions 
about persistence that fuel metaphysical theories. This would be a way for cognitive 
science to join these two disparate ﬁ  elds, helping to understand the possible origins 
and reliability of various metaphysical intuitions, and perhaps leading to philosophical 
progress. 
  As a part of analytic philosophy, the study of object persistence in metaphysics 
takes as its goal to analyze our concept of persistence  —  and persistence itself, as a © 2007 The Author
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purely metaphysical issue  —  explaining what it means for an object to persist, and 
developing criteria that govern when objects do and do not persist (for reviews 
see   Gallois, 1995; Haslanger, 2003; Kurtz, 2006; Sider 2000  ). The typical method 
in this area, as in most such philosophical projects, is a priori in nature: analyses 
are developed and then tested against our intuitions about when objects do and 
do not persist, both in general and in the context of particular situations and 
puzzles. In addition, such analyses can be tested for their ﬁ  t with other analyses 
of neighboring metaphysical concepts (e.g. of space and time), in pursuit of a 
coherent theory of the nature of reality. I discuss the methodology of such 
projects  —  and in particular their use of intuitions about persistence  —  in more 
detail below, in Section 5. 
  This is a large and fractious literature, with many competing views of persistence, 
and the ensuing discussion here makes no attempt to be systematically inclusive of 
the various positions. I instead limit the focus of this paper to three of what I take 
to be the most foundational and salient themes from this philosophical investigation: 
(1) spatiotemporal continuity, (2) persistence through property change, and (3) 
cohesion. Sections 2, 3, and 4 of this paper respectively discuss these three themes 
in turn.    1     
  Each of these sections introduces a theme of object persistence in its conceptual 
or philosophical context, and then discusses how that same theme has led to 
empirical discoveries in recent psychological research about the nature of object 
persistence in perception and cognition. This empirical work has not only explored 
the factors that determine when we experience objects as persisting (or not), but 
has also demonstrated that computations of object persistence are critical for 
understanding many other processes such as visual memory (e.g.   Cheries   et al.  , 
2006; Flombaum and Scholl, 2006  ), implicit learning (e.g.   Fiser, Scholl and Aslin, 
2007  ), numerical cognition (e.g.   Feigenson, Dehaene and Spelke, 2004)  , motion 
perception (e.g.   Dawson, 1991  ), search and foraging (e.g.   Flombaum, Kundey, 
Santos and Scholl, 2004; Santos, 2004  ), and even visual awareness in the ﬁ  rst place 
(e.g.   Mitroff and Scholl, 2005  ;   Moore and Lleras, 2005  ). 
  This work has been conducted in several subﬁ   elds of experimental 
psychology, and the work reviewed below includes studies of adult visual 
cognition, as well as studies of   ‘  core knowledge  ’   of objects in both human 
infants and nonhuman primates. This collection of research is not arbitrary, as 
a growing number of researchers think of these areas as studying the same 
        1           It may be worth noting that the   ‘  objects  ’   under investigation as discussed here will be assumed 
to be typical everyday objects (e.g. cars or basketballs), though these are often studied via their 
visual representations (as in studies of simple colored shapes on a computer monitor). In 
contrast, I do not discuss entities that are spatially extended beyond our immediate experience 
(e.g. lakes) or the sets that philosophers sometimes call   ‘  unnatural  ’   objects (e.g. the   ‘  object  ’   
consisting of my left arm plus Wisconsin). What it means to be an   ‘  object  ’   in the ﬁ  rst place is 
of course a deep question in its own right, but it will not be relevant to this discussion  —
  though it has also seen its share of psychological progress in recent years (e.g. see   Ben-Shahar, 
Scholl and Zucker, 2007; Feldman, in press; Scholl, 2001a  ).   © 2007 The Author
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underlying processes of visual cognition (  Carey and Xu, 2001; Feigenson, 
Carey and Hauser, 2002; Scholl and Leslie, 1999  ). Collectively, this research 
converges on the idea that there are mental mechanisms for computing object 
persistence that are   primitive   in three senses: (1) they occur relatively early in 
perceptual processing, such that they are largely   ‘  hardwired  ’   parts of perception 
that then constraint later cognition; (2) they arise early in human infancy; and 
(3) they arose early enough in phylogenetic development to be shared by some 
of our fellow primates.     
    2. Theme #1: Spatiotemporal Continuity 
  What factors determine whether an object at time t1 and an object at time t2 are 
the same individual? The one intuitive constraint that immediately comes to mind 
is that of spatiotemporal continuity: for two objects encountered at different 
locations to be subsequent stages of the same individual, there must be a 
spatiotemporally continuous path between them. If an object disappears at one 
location, and an object immediately appears at a different spatially separated 
location, then those two instances cannot be the same object, since physical laws 
do not allow for that sort of thing (at least at the spatial and temporal scales that 
characterize our everyday interaction with objects). 
  Because of its intuitive appeal, spatiotemporal continuity has long been taken as 
a key principle of persistence in philosophical theorizing (see   Burke, 1980; Coburn, 
1971; Hirsch, 1976  ).   ‘  [S]patiotemporal continuity   …   [is] a logically necessary 
condition of identity  ’   (  Shoemaker, 1963  , pp. 4-5), and it is simply   ‘  part of our 
common-sense concept of a thing that its existence is spatiotemporally continuous. 
It never leaps gaps in either time or space  ’   (  Armstrong, 1963  , p. 220). For various 
statements of spatiotemporal continuity as a key principle of persistence, including 
formal characterizations, see   Coburn, 1971  . Some discussions of spatiotemporal 
continuity seem to take it as a sufﬁ   cient as well as a necessary criterion. For 
example:   ‘  [I]n a series of events which common sense would regard as belonging 
to one   “  thing  ”  , the similarity need only be between events not widely separated in 
space-time  ’   (  Russell, 1948  , p. 488). Most theorists, however, take it as merely a 
necessary principle. This is in part because many philosophers are concerned with 
the persistence of objects considered under sortals (see   Hirsch, 1982; Grandy, 
2007; Wiggins, 2001; Xu, 1997, in press  ). For example, an object such as a car that 
is about to be crushed may soon cease to exist despite its continuous spatiotemporal 
trace with the resulting cube of metal (  Hirsch, 1982  ); perhaps something continues 
to exist, but the   car   is gone. (Issues involving sortal concepts will not be considered 
in the present paper, in part for reasons that will become clear in Section 3.) Even 
these theories still give spatiotemporal continuity a bedrock role, however. For 
example, accounts which attempt to avoid large featural transformations of objects 
typically still consider such constraints in the context of a more basic principle of 
continuity;  ‘  The basic rule is: Trace an object ’  s career by following a spatiotemporally © 2007 The Author
Journal compilation © 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
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and qualitatively continuous path which minimizes changes as far as possible  ’   
(  Hirsch, 1976  , p. 366). 
  Perhaps because physical laws simply do not allow for ﬂ  agrant violations of 
spatiotemporal continuity, this principle has also become wired into our minds, 
and helps to control our experience of objects as persisting in the world. The 
research that demonstrates this indicates that the principle is primitive in three 
senses. First, a   ‘  principle  ’   of spatiotemporal continuity seems to characterize 
relatively automatic visual processing. We have demonstrated this, for example, 
using a multiple object tracking (MOT) task (  Pylyshyn and Storm, 1988  ). This 
task in some ways forces observers to judge object persistence (but see   Pylyshyn, 
2004; Scholl, in press  ). In a typical MOT experiment (see       Figure    1  ), observers 
initially see a number of qualitatively identical objects. A subset of these are then 
ﬂ  ashed to indicate their status as targets, after which all of the (again identical) 
objects begin moving independently and unpredictably about the display. When 
they stop moving, observers must indicate which of the objects are the original 
targets.    2     To explore the inﬂ  uence of spatiotemporal continuity on the ability to 
perform this task, we required observers to track multiple objects as they moved in 
a display ﬁ  lled with occluders (  Scholl and Pylyshyn, 1999)  . Occlusion is a challenge 
to the implemention of any principle of continuity, given its ecological ubiquity: 
objects may not pop into and out of existence, but they do frequently pop into 
and out of   sight  . To show that a mere disruption of visual stimulation would not 
impair object persistence, we demonstrated that MOT is just as accurate when the 
objects frequently disappear for a moment behind the occluders (as in       Figure    2b  ) as 
when they simply move atop those same contours (as in   Figure    2a  ). 
  (a) (b) (c)  
                  Figure     1           A schematic depiction of multiple object tracking (MOT). (a) Four items are initially 
ﬂ   ashed to indicate their status as targets. (b) All items then begin moving independently and 
unpredictably around the display. (c) At the end of the motion phase, the subject must move the cursor 
about the screen to highlight the four targets  —  here the subject has just highlighted three of the targets, 
and is moving the mouse cursor to the fourth. Animations of this task and many others described in 
this paper can be viewed or downloaded over the internet via http://www.yale.edu/perception/       
        2           This type of task is inherently dynamic, of course. Readers may experience MOT  —  and many 
of the other visual paradigms and phenomena described in this paper  —  by viewing or 
downloading animations at http://www.yale.edu/perception/   © 2007 The Author
Journal compilation © 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
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  Unimpaired MOT performance in the context of these occluders, however, 
required the presence of accretion and deletion cues along ﬁ  xed contours at the 
occluding boundaries. In contrast, performance was signiﬁ  cantly impaired when 
objects were present on the visual ﬁ  eld at the same times and to the same degrees 
as in the occlusion conditions, but disappeared and reappeared in ways which did 
not implicate the presence of occluding surfaces  —  e.g. by imploding and exploding 
into and out of existence, instead of accreting and deleting along a ﬁ  xed contour 
(see   Figure    2c  ). Thus, when these subtle visual cues indicate that the momentary 
disappearances reﬂ  ected the objects going out of sight, the disappearances did not 
affect tracking  —  but when these cues indicated that the objects were going out of 
existence momentarily, observers were no longer able to track them as persisting 
individuals, despite their brute visual similarity to the   ‘  trackable  ’   displays (  Scholl 
and Feigenson, 2004  ). Critically, notice that this inability did not reﬂ  ect observers  ’   
beliefs or strategies: they knew perfectly well what was going on in the   ‘  implosion/
explosion  ’   conditions, and would liked to have ignored those cues. But they could 
not  —  indicating that this particular type of principle of spatiotemporal continuity 
is encapsulated from our beliefs and preferences, and is part of the basic processes 
that help to generate visual experience. 
  Spatiotemporal continuity also appears to constitute a primitive psychological 
principle in at least two other senses, relating to ontogenetic and phylogenetic 
development. First, this principle comes online relatively early in development. This 
can in part be shown using the same manipulations discussed above: 10-month-old 
infants can maintain a representation of the number of moving objects (2 versus 3) 
in a display with occluders when those objects occlude and disocclude, but not when 
           
          Figure     2           Depictions of how an object might interact with an occluder in three conditions in studies of 
multiple object tracking through occlusion (Scholl and Feigenson, 2004; Scholl and Pylyshyn, 1999). 
(a) The object does not disappear, but simply moves atop the other contours. (b) The object is 
momentarily occluded  —  deleting from its trailing edge as it disappears and then accreting from its 
leading edge upon its reappearance. Tracking in this condition is unimpaired. (c) The object moves 
through the same trajectory, disappearing at the same time and the same rate as in (b), but now it 
gradually   ‘  implodes  ’   to a point, and then later   ‘  explodes  ’   from a point. This violates spatiotemporal 
continuity, greatly impairing tracking       © 2007 The Author
Journal compilation © 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
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they implode and explode (  Cheries, Feigenson, Scholl and Carey, 2005  ; see also 
  Bertenthal, Longo and Kenny, 2007; Kaufman, Csibra and Johnson, 2005  ). Other 
studies have demonstrated an appreciation for spatiotemporal continuity in infancy 
using a more direct method. For example, the looking-time behavior of 5-month-
old infants who observe a rod that moves sequentially behind two screens (see 
      Figure    3a  ) indicates that they perceive the event in terms of a single persisting object, 
but they instead seem to perceive two distinct objects if the rod does not traverse the 
space in between the two screens (  Figure    3b; Spelke     et al.  , 1995; see also   Aguiar and 
Baillargeon, 2002  , for similar experiments with even younger infants). Moreover, 
even nonhuman primates seem to make this inference (  Santos, 2004  ): if rhesus 
macaques observe a piece of food roll behind a screen and then a piece of food roll 
between the screens, disappearing behind the second screen (as in   Figure    3a  , but now 
with objects rolling down a ramp), their resulting foraging behavior indicates that 
they think there was only a single piece of food involved. But if the piece of food 
does not appear between the two screens (as in   Figure    3b  ), then their resulting foraging 
behavior indicates an appreciation that there were two pieces of food involved. In 
each of these cases, the critical factor controlling looking times and searching behavior 
seems to be the principle of spatiotemporal continuity  —  which in turn seems to be 
wired into our minds in a deep way, controlling how we experience the world.   
    3. Theme #2: Persistence Through Property Change 
  A second salient theme in philosophical theories of object persistence involves the 
need to reconcile persistence over time with changes in the properties of objects. 
How, for example, can we say that a banana is the same object over time when it 
 
(a) (b)
     
          Figure     3           A schematic depiction of events used to study spatiotemporal continuity in studies of infants 
(Spelke et al., 1995) and nonhuman primates (Santos, 2004; with objects rolling down ramps behind 
screens). (a) An object moves behind a ﬁ  rst screen, then an object moves between the two screens, then 
an object emerges from the second screen and continues moving (after which it may change direction and 
these events occur again in reverse order, in some experiments where the event cycles). It is natural to 
experience this event (as infants and monkeys seem to do) as a single object that moves behind two 
screens. (b) When the same event proceeds but without an object ever appearing between the two 
screens, it is natural to experience it (as infants and monkeys seem   to do) as involving two distinct 
objects, one moving behind each screen     © 2007 The Author
Journal compilation © 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
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is yellow at time t1, but brown at time t2? At ﬁ  rst blush this can seem like a silly 
question, but it has been one of the primary obsessions for philosophers at least as 
far back as Plato and Aristotle. Leibniz, for example  —  as part of the formulation of 
what we now call Leibniz  ’   Law  —  noted the difﬁ  culty in simultaneously maintaining 
three beliefs that each individually seem intuitive: (1) Nothing can have conﬂ  icting 
properties (e.g. being both fully brown and fully yellow); (2) Changes may involve 
conﬂ  icting properties (e.g. turning from yellow to brown); but (3) Objects can 
persist as the same individuals through changes. When these beliefs are combined, 
there is trouble. This problem is very simple to formulate, but it could not be a 
more central challenge to metaphysical theorizing about object persistence. (For 
example, it is essentially the very ﬁ  rst issue raised in almost every recent review of 
this literature; e.g.   Haslanger, 2003; Kurtz, 2006; Wiggins, 2001  .) It also arises in 
more particular puzzles, for example about whether a statue is identical to the 
lump of clay from which it was formed (e.g.   Gibbard, 1975  ). 
  Despite its simplicity, this challenge  —    ‘  the traditional problem of change  ’   (  Sider, 
2000  )  —  ends up requiring exceedingly complex, nuanced solutions. Most currently 
popular solutions come in one of three types, which I will brieﬂ  y describe because 
they will re-enter the discussion below, in Section 5, in a discussion of the 
connection between empirical results and philosophical intuitions.   Perdurance   
theories (e.g.   Lewis, 1986; Quine, 1950  ) suggest that objects have   temporal parts   just 
as they have spatial parts (for extensive discussion, see   Sider, 2001a  ). My right arm 
is a part of me, but so is the way I was at exactly noon today  —  and I (as an object) 
extend into the past just as I extend in height. On this view, an object is simply a 
sequence of ﬂ  eeting   stages   (  ‘  all the world  ’  s a stage  ’  ;   Sider, 1996  )  —  but because only 
one of these stages actually exists at any given moment, an object is never fully 
present at any given time (just as I am never fully present in any single 2D spatial 
plane). This ducks the problem of change by relativizing changes to time: it  ’  s not 
that the banana is both yellow and brown, but that one of its (temporal) parts is 
yellow, and another of its parts is brown  —  and those parts/stages never exist at the 
same time. But, counterintuitively, change can no longer be thought of as alteration 
on this view: because the   object   extends backward and forward in time as a   ‘  space-time 
worm  ’  , its properties never actually   change  , per se. 
    Exdurance   theories (e.g.   Hawley, 2002; Sider, 1996  ) are similar: they are also 
  ‘  stage  ’   theories that appeal to temporal parts, but they claim that an object is 
identical with a given stage. Thus an object is fully present at any given moment 
(unlike a space-time worm), but it is never the same object from moment to 
moment  —  and so again it cannot truly change. (For our purposes here, the 
difference between perdurance and exdurance theories is subtle, and will not be 
important.) Finally,   Endurance   theories (e.g.   van Inwagen, 1990  ) are in some ways 
the most intuitive accounts of persistence (see   Haslanger, 2003  ), since unlike the 
stage theories they maintain that the very same object is present from moment to 
moment: I am here now, and now, and now  —  and I do not need to be thought of 
as extending into the past and future the way that I extend in space. Endurantists 
must thus appeal to other maneuvers in order to relativize properties to individual © 2007 The Author
Journal compilation © 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
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times (and thus avoid contravening Leibniz  ’   Law), but in doing so they create 
other problems, counterintuitively denying that objects can have (  ‘  intrinsic  ’  ) 
properties irrespective of particular times. 
  The persistence of objects through property changes has also been a salient 
theme in empirical work on our experience of object persistence  —  but less as a 
challenge, and more as a brute phenomenon. In general, there are two importantly 
different routes that can lead you to identify an object as the same over time. First, 
you can note what the object looks like: if you see an animal that is short and 
brown, and then you see an animal that is tall and yellow, then they are unlikely 
to be the same animal. Second, you can identify objects as the same based on how 
and where they move through the local visual environment: if you see an animal 
appear from behind one tree, and then see an animal appear from behind a different 
tree, then they cannot be the same animal, for the reasons discussed in the previous 
section. But critically, this second sort of   “  sameness  ”   is independent of the ﬁ  rst. If 
spatiotemporal continuity is violated, then the two animals must be different, even 
if they look the same. In contrast, changes in properties do not necessarily foil 
sameness, because of property change. 
  This conceptual asymmetry expresses itself in many empirical demonstrations of 
  spatiotemporal priority   ( Scholl, 2001b ): across many different paradigms and phenomena, 
when deciding whether an object is the same persisting individual from some earlier 
time, factors relating to how and where that object has moved will always trump 
factors relating to what the object looks like. Perhaps the most direct demonstration 
of spatiotemporal priority is in the   ‘  tunnel effect  ’   (  Burke, 1952  ;   Michotte   et al.  , 
1964/1991)  : one object moves behind an occluder (the   ‘  tunnel  ’  ), and then a very 
different (-looking) object emerges from the other side of the occluder and continues 
moving (      Figure    4  ). If the second object emerges at about the time and place that one 
       
          Figure     4           The   ‘  tunnel effect  ’  : an object moves behind an occluder, and then an object with very different 
surface features emerges on the other side of the occluder. When the emerging object appears just where 
and when it should had the initial object continued its motion, we irresistibly perceive a single persisting 
object that changed its surface features (Flombaum and Scholl, 2006; Michotte et al., 1964/1991)       © 2007 The Author
Journal compilation © 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
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would expect the ﬁ  rst object to emerge, had it continued its motion, we tend to 
perceive the uninterrupted and uniform motion of a single object. Critically, the 
tunnel effect obtains even when the object emerging from the tunnel differs from 
the one that entered in terms of its surface features (e.g. turning from red to green; 
  Burke, 1952  ) and its kind (e.g. turning from a kiwi to a lemon;   Flombaum   et al.  , 
2004  ). In such situations, spatiotemporally continuous motion leads the visual 
system to discount the featural difference between the pre- and post-tunnel objects, 
and thus to generate the percept of a single object (which changes its features 
while occluded) rather than the percept of two separate objects, one of which was 
initially hidden by the tunnel. In contrast, when an extra temporal delay is introduced 
between the occlusion of the ﬁ  rst object and the emergence of the second, observers 
perceive the successive motion of two different objects  —  the ﬁ  rst of which must 
remain hidden by the tunnel (  Burke, 1952  ). 
  This effect is not simply an isolated visual illusion, but can end up playing a 
major role in determining the contents of our perceptual experience. This was 
made especially salient in a recent comparative study exploring free-ranging rhesus 
macaques  ’   perception of the tunnel effect in a foraging task (  Flombaum   et al.  , 
2004  ). As depicted in       Figure    5  , Monkeys watched as a lemon rolled down a ramp 
and came to rest behind a tunnel (Occluder 1), and then as a kiwi emerged and 
became occluded at the end of its path behind a screen (Occluder 2). When the 
kiwi emerged at about the time that the lemon should have (had it continued its 
motion), subjects searched for food only behind Occluder 2  —  apparently perceiving 
       
          Figure     5           Sample stills from a demonstration of the tunnel effect in rhesus monkeys (Flombaum, 
Kundey, Santos and Scholl, 2004). The subject watches as a lemon rolls down the ramp (Frames 
A-B) and becomes concealed by Occluder 1 (Frame C), and then as kiwi rolls down the remainder of 
the ramp (Frames D-E) and becomes concealed by Occluder 2 (Frame F). Finally, the experimenter 
walks away, and the subject is given the opportunity to search (Frame F). When the kiwi appears to 
continue the spatiotemporal trajectory of the lemon (with no temporal gap), the subjects search for food 
only behind the second occluder  —  apparently perceiving a single persisting object which changed from a 
lemon to a kiwi       © 2007 The Author
Journal compilation © 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
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the lemon transform into a kiwi on the basis of spatiotemporally continuous motion. 
(We included other control conditions to verify that the monkeys did in fact 
recognize the featural difference.) In contrast, when a brief pause interrupted the 
occlusion of the lemon and the emergence of the kiwi, monkeys searched for food 
behind both occluders  —  apparently perceiving two distinct objects, and assuming 
(on the basis of that featural difference) that the lemon must have remained in the 
tunnel. In this way the tunnel effect directly inﬂ  uenced not only the monkeys  ’   
percepts, but also their subsequent spontaneous behaviors. 
  This type of spatiotemporal priority also seems to be a primitive part of adult 
visual cognition: it is not a decision that we make, but a reﬂ  ection of the underlying 
machinery of perception. In human adults, for example, the tunnel effect mediates 
automatic visual working memory (  Flombaum and Scholl, 2006  ). In these 
experiments, observers had to detect color changes in displays where several objects 
oscillated behind occluders and occasionally changed color. Across comparisons 
with several types of spatiotemporal gaps, as well as manipulations of occlusion 
versus implosion (as described in the previous section), performance was better 
when objects  ’   kinematics gave the impression of a persisting individual. In other 
words, the results revealed a   temporal same-object advantage  : better change detection 
across temporal scene fragments bound into the same persisting object 
representations  —  suggesting that persisting objects are the underlying units of visual 
memory. Critically, this was true despite the intentions of observers in this 
experiment: they knew that the presence of spatial or temporal gaps was irrelevant 
to their task, yet these manipulations (and others such as implosion/explosion) 
irresistibly impaired their performance. 
  Finally, this type of spatiotemporal priority also manifests itself in terms of our 
visual percepts themselves, and not only in the tunnel effect. For example, in 
apparent motion, two featurally-dissimilar ﬂ  ashes will still be perceived as subsequent 
stages of a single object so long as they occur in quick enough succession and in 
nearby locations (  Kolers and Pomerantz, 1971  ). As in           Figure    6  , for example, you 
might see frame 1 followed by frame 2  —  quickly enough that the visual system is 
led to perceive motion. But this presents a correspondence problem: which went 
where? Based on your knowledge about the possibility and likelihood of property 
  (a) (b)      
          Figure     6           An example of ﬁ  gural change in apparent motion. Observers see the two frames ﬂ  ashed in quick 
succession, so that the visual system infers motion. Despite the salient ﬁ  gural identities, however, observers 
will not see horizontal motion: instead, the vertical proximity trumps surface-feature processing, and 
observers see two vertically translating objects that dramatically change their visual features as they move       © 2007 The Author
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changes, you might judge that the square in frame 1 moved to the right, while the 
disc moved to the left. But that is not what you  ’  ll   see  : since the objects are separated 
by a greater distance in the horizontal direction, spatiotemporal priority will 
dominate, and you  ‘  ll irresistibly see the objects translate vertically, swapping all of 
their features in the process (e.g.   Burt and Sperling, 1981; Navon, 1976  ). 
  The studies described here collectively illustrate that persistence through featural 
change is a part of how we experience the world in a primitive sense: our visual 
systems appear to be constructed so that featural changes are often irrelevant for 
determining object persistence. As described in more detail in the following 
section, the visual system appears to represent objects via representations called 
  ‘  object ﬁ  les  ’  , and the automatic processes that control the construction, destruction, 
and maintenance of object ﬁ  les seem wired to discount featural changes. Such 
changes may still be salient, but they are limited to updating the   contents   of object 
ﬁ  les, and cannot directly control their creation or maintenance (  Mitroff and Alvarez, 
in press  ; but see   Moore, Mordkoff and Enns, 2007  ).   
    4. Theme #3: Cohesion 
  If spatiotemporal continuity is the most obvious principle involved mediating 
object persistence (as described in Section 2), then perhaps the most obvious 
problems for this principle are violations of   cohesion    —  wherein an object fails to 
maintain a single cohesive boundary over time. In such cases, there is no single 
continuous space-time   ‘  worm  ’   to track; instead, this worm splits into multiple 
strands. One of the simplest types of cohesion violations that has been much 
discussed in the philosophical literature is that of   ﬁ  ssion  , wherein one object splits 
into two (e.g.   Parﬁ  t, 1971; Williams, 1956-1957  ; cf.   Locke, 1689  /1975). The 
  ‘  objects  ’   in many such examples are people: via various science-ﬁ  ction scenarios 
(e.g. involving Star-Trekesque transporter malfunctions), one person ends up 
resulting in two (often exactly similar) people. The conceptual possibility of such 
examples is taken to pose a deep problem for theories of persistence: diachronic 
numerical identity cannot hold between an single object and two distinct objects, 
but by hypothesis in such examples there is nothing to prefer one possible 
continuant over the other. (In contrast, an example of cloning doesn  ’  t present a 
serious problem, since there would then be reasons related to spatiotemporal 
continuity for preferring the   ‘  original  ’   person as the same persisting individual, 
rather than the clone.) Such   ‘  ﬁ  ssion  cases  ’   have been central to philosophical 
theorizing about object persistence ever since such projects began, at least back to 
the 18  th   century (see   Martin, Barresi and Giovannelli, 1998  ). 
  The metaphysical problem posed by such examples echoes in other areas of 
philosophy  —  e.g. in ethics, where we might wonder which of the resulting two 
people can or should be held responsible for past crimes committed by the initial 
single person. As a result, ﬁ  ssion examples are especially popular in the enormous 
literature devoted speciﬁ  cally to issues of   personal identity   (e.g. see   Baillie, 1993; © 2007 The Author
Journal compilation © 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
  Object Persistence in Philosophy and Psychology    575
Gendler, in press   a;   Noonan, 1993  ), and these debates often end up turning on 
psychological issues unrelated to physical objects  —  e.g. involving memory. 
Nevertheless, the essential problem posed by ﬁ   ssion examples also applies to 
physical objects  —  and so while I will sometimes mention examples involving 
people, this will not be important: this type of puzzle   ‘  is not so much about 
  personal   identity through ﬁ  ssion, as it is about the identity through ﬁ  ssion of any 
dividing object   …   . After all, the ﬁ  ssion of any object   …   might seem   ‘  doubly 
perplexing  ’   for those who believe that there must be a true answer to questions 
about its identity in any describable case  ’   (  Merricks, 1997  , p. 181). 
  In any case, there are also several hallowed philosophical problems involving 
cohesion violations in more mundane physical objects. For example, suppose a 
watchmaker, in repairing a watch, takes it apart and temporarily stores the various 
pieces in different locations before putting it back together (e.g.   Wiggins, 2001, 
chapter 3  ). In this case we are intuitively drawn to say that the resulting watch is 
the same individual that was initially taken apart  —  but how can this be reconciled 
with the fact that it traced no single spatiotemporally continuous path during its 
repair? Perhaps the most famous puzzle involving a cohesion violation, of course, 
is that of the   ‘  Ship of Theseus  ’   (e.g.   Hobbes, 1672  /1913): a ship is repaired 
gradually, one plank at a time, until none of its initial materials remain. Meanwhile, 
a scavenger has collected each discarded plank, and eventually uses them to rebuild 
the original ship. The puzzle: which of the two resulting ships is the same individual 
as the initial ship? In other words, which is the Ship of Theseus? 
  Puzzles involving cohesion violations end up requiring one of several types of 
revisions to theories of object persistence: for example, they may appeal to the idea 
that there were really somehow two objects that constituted the initial entity or 
that there is a single resulting object with two spatially separated parts (e.g.   Lewis, 
1976  )  —  or they may (radically) give up on the one-to-one logic of the identity 
principle (e.g.   Gallois, 1998; Geach, 1997  ). For our purposes, the important point 
about ﬁ   ssion is simply that such cases are problematic precisely because they 
challenge our intuitions about what it means for an object to persist over time. It 
is not just that we do not know what to say in such cases, but that we are led 
directly to apparent conﬂ  icts. For example, if half of an object erodes away over 
time, we are inclined to intuit that it remains that same object. But if instead the 
object is simply broken in two in an instant, we are inclined to intuit that neither 
of the resulting halves is identical to the initial object  —  even if one of them were 
somehow the exact duplicate of the eroded object. 
  The literature on object persistence in experimental psychology has also grappled 
with cohesion violations, and for many of these same reasons. Here cohesion is 
often considered as the one of the principles of   “  core knowledge  ”  : an object must 
maintain a single bounded contour in order to be represented as persisting over 
time (e.g.   Spelke, 1990, 2000  ). Indeed, this principle may be uniquely important, 
in that it helps deﬁ  ne what counts as an object in the ﬁ  rst place. If you want to 
know what an object is, just   “  grab some and pull  ”  ; the stuff that comes with your 
hand is the object, and the stuff that doesn  ’  t is not. This has led some theorists to © 2007 The Author
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claim that cohesion is perhaps the single most important principle of what it means 
to be an object (e.g.   Bloom, 2000; Pinker, 1997  ). 
  Some of the resulting empirical literature has explored cohesion violations via 
the contrast between objects and nonsolid substances. For example, infants  ’   ability 
to keep track of small sets of objects is disrupted if the objects (e.g. sand piles) pour 
from one location to another rather than moving as uniﬁ  ed wholes (  Huntley-
Fenner, Carey and Solimando, 2002  ). This is true for adult visual cognition as 
well. Using the multiple-object tracking task described in Section 2, for example, 
observers were asked to track spatially extended objects that repeatedly moved in 
a particular type of noncohesive motion: each object began as a small square, but 
then split into many smaller units and moved in a non-rigid manner  —  essentially 
  ‘  pouring  ’   from one location to another, as would a nonsolid substance. This 
manipulation greatly impaired tracking, despite the fact that the   ‘  objects  ’   still 
followed the same trajectories as typical MOT control conditions (  vanMarle and 
Scholl, 2003  ). (This is the sort of inherently dynamic display that isn  ’  t really worth 
trying to depict in a ﬁ  gure, but the animations can be viewed online; see footnote 
2.) These examples involve cohesion violations  —  similar but more extreme than 
watch disassembly  —  but not in the sense that characterizes most ﬁ  ssion examples in 
philosophy. After all, subjects (or their visual systems) may conclude from such 
displays that the relevant entities are not (and never were) objects at all, but were 
rather nonsolid substances. In contrast, the objects in most philosophical ﬁ  ssion 
cases  —  e.g. the watch, the person, or the Ship of Theseus  —  were bona ﬁ  de objects 
before the ﬁ  ssion occurred. 
  Additional research, however, has also explored the ways in which visual 
processing copes with ﬁ  ssion cases that are almost a direct analogue of the relevant 
philosophical examples (albeit not using Star-Trek-like transporters). This research 
has exploited the   ‘  object reviewing  ’   paradigm as illustrated in       Figure    7  . In this task 
       
          Figure     7           Sample displays used in the object-reviewing paradigm (Kahneman et al., 1992). Subjects 
see two preview letters in an initial display and a single probe letter in a ﬁ  nal display, and must simply 
indicate whether the ﬁ  nal probe was present in the initial preview display. Responses are faster when 
the probe letter had initially appeared in that same object during the preview display, compared to when 
it had appeared in the other object. In the static displays, the target is seen as the same object as one of 
the previews, because it appears on the same object, in the same location. Objecthood and location are 
unconfounded in the moving displays       © 2007 The Author
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(  Kahneman, Treisman and Gibbs, 1992  ), a number of objects are initially presented, 
and distinct letters (or other distinguishable features) appear brieﬂ  y on some of 
them. The objects then move about the visual display for a brief period, after 
which a single probe letter appears on just one of the objects. The subject  ’  s task, 
in one variant of this paradigm (see   Noles, Scholl and Mitroff, 2005  ) is to use a 
keypress to indicate whether the ﬁ  nal probe letter was the same as   any   of the 
initially presented letters. This response will be slightly faster when the probe is 
the same letter that initially appeared on   that same object  , compared to when it was 
the letter that had initially appeared on a different object  —  an   object-speciﬁ  c preview 
beneﬁ  t   (OSPB). This effect can thus be used as an index of persisting objecthood: 
manipulations which degrade enduring object representations will result in 
attenuated OSPBs (e.g.   Gao and Scholl  , under review;   Mitroff, Scholl and Wynn, 
2005; Noles   et al.  , 2005  ). 
  One recent study reasoned that if cohesion was really such a powerful   ‘  core  ’   
principle of object persistence, then even the simplest possible cohesion violation  —
  a single object splitting into two  —  should impair processing (  Mitroff, Scholl and 
Wynn, 2004  ). We tested this using the object reviewing paradigm with displays in 
which one object split into two resulting objects, as depicted in       Figure    8  . (This 
ﬁ  gure, not accidentally, is similar to those ﬁ  gural illustrations of ﬁ  ssion cases in 
many philosophical treatments  —  e.g.   Johnston, 1989  , p. 383;   Sider, 1996  , p. 435.) 
       
          Figure     8           A subset of the trial types from a study of cohesion violations using the object reviewing 
paradigm (Mitroff, Scholl and Wynn, 2004). In each case observers simply responded as quickly as 
possible whether the ﬁ  nal letter appeared anywhere in the initial preview display on that trial. Objects 
either traveled a straight trajectory, a curved trajectory, or smoothly split into two separate objects. (The 
actual experiment also included No-Match trials for each condition, in which the ﬁ  nal probe letter was 
neither of the initially presented letters, and factors such as the relative orientations were always 
counterbalanced and randomized, such that the ﬁ  nal probe letter could appear on any ﬁ  nal object.) As 
described in the text, these cohesion violations produced considerable costs in visual processing, relative 
to controls that are not depicted here       © 2007 The Author
Journal compilation © 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
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Critically, this splitting was smooth and symmetrical, so that there was nothing to 
bias one of the resulting objects over the other. (A second non-splitting object is 
also present in each display as a control.) The theoretical question concerns what 
happens to the underlying object representation of the initial object  —  its   ‘  object 
ﬁ  le  ’    —  as a result of the ﬁ  ssion. There are several possibilities that correspond 
to various philosophical positions on ﬁ   ssion cases: (1) the cohesion violation 
might obliterate the object ﬁ  le  ’  s contents entirely; (2) the information about the 
preview letter might survive the   ‘  splitting  ’   intact, but stay bound to only one of 
the two resulting objects, indicating that object ﬁ  les cannot themselves split into 
two; or (3) the object ﬁ  le  ’  s contents might essentially be   ‘  copied  ’   to both of the 
two resulting objects. In other words, this experiment assesses how the visual 
system copes with the same ﬁ  ssion cases that have proven so problematic for 
philosophy. 
  The results of this study indicated that although we can of course readily 
perceive an object that splits into two, this produces great underlying costs in 
visual processing. In the ﬁ  rst case, the OSPBs that resulted from such manipulations 
were often only half the size of those that occurred in control conditions with 
similar movement but without cohesion violations. In addition, such processing 
disrupted the maintenance of object-speciﬁ  c information on other objects in the 
display  —  e.g. destroying the OSPB for the additional non-splitting object in 
  Figure    8  . These costs suggest that the visual system ends up effectively splitting the 
actual object representations that underlie the object(s) in this event, such that one 
object ﬁ   le is eventually replaced with two object ﬁ   les, into which the initial 
contents of the ﬁ  rst ﬁ  le are copied. (There is no indication in these studies of 
bimodal response patterns, which would suggest that the object ﬁ  le   ‘  went with  ’   
only one of the post-split objects.) The fact that this process resulted in substantial 
costs to visual processing, however, indicates that this event is seen as exceptional, 
and requires more resources to handle than is the norm in the perception of 
simple events. 
  Emboldened by this result, we later showed that a single object splitting into 
two also severely disrupts infants  ’   persisting object representations (  Cheries, Mitroff, 
Wynn and Scholl, in press)  . In a forced-choice crawling paradigm, 10- and 12-
month-old infants witnessed crackers being sequentially placed into containers, 
and they subsequently crawled toward the container with the greater cracker 
quantity. When one of the crackers was visibly split in half, however, infants failed 
to represent the relative quantities, despite careful controls for the overall quantities 
and the motions involved: now they crawled randomly toward one of the two 
containers, rather than preferring the one with the greater cracker quantity. This 
impairment was especially striking given that infants of this age must frequently see 
real objects (e.g. pieces of food) that are split into two. The collective punchline 
of all these studies is then similar to those in the previous sections: these experiments 
indicate that cohesion  —  and the processing of cohesion violations  —  is represented 
in a primitive way in visual processing, such that it operates automatically in both 
adults visual cognition and in infancy.   © 2007 The Author
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    5. Can Psychological Discoveries about Object Persistence Drive 
Philosophical Progress? 
  The previous sections described three salient themes from philosophical treatments 
of object persistence  —  spatiotemporal continuity, persistence through featural 
change, and cohesion  —  that have also each been foci of empirical research from 
the study of visual cognition in experimental psychology. Why might such 
connections be important? 
    5.1 A Heuristic for Generating Ideas (and an Aside on   ‘  Experimental 
Philosophy  ’  ) 
  In the ﬁ  rst place, pointing out such connections could have some heuristic value 
in generating ideas and hypotheses in each ﬁ   eld. This has been the case, for 
example, in a few previous papers that have attempted to link philosophical and 
psychological accounts of object persistence. Sometimes this has involved importing 
philosophical concepts into empirical work  —  e.g. in   ‘  sortal  ’  -based theories of infant 
individuation (  Xu and Carey, 1996  ). Such identiﬁ  cations may then lead back to 
implications for philosophical theories, if the empirical evidence is taken to lead 
them in new directions (  Xu, 1997  ). In other cases, psychologists have simply taken 
various puzzles from the philosophical literature, and then tested subjects  ’   intuitions 
on various cases that systematically manipulate relevant variables, leading to 
discoveries about the importance of new factors, or the developmental progression 
of the relevant intuitions. For instance, the   ‘  Ship of Theseus  ’   problem has been 
used in this way (  Hall, 1998  ), as have other ﬁ  ssion examples (  Rips   et al.  , 2006  ). 
This work might be considered as an example of   ‘  experimental philosophy  ’   (cf. 
  Nichols, 2004  ), since its methods essentially replicate what philosophers do. 
Whereas philosophers may consult their own intuitions about various cases, these 
psychologists are consulting others  ’   intuitions about such cases, albeit using various 
types of more sensitive measures (e.g. rating scales) and then quantitatively 
comparing the results of various manipulations. 
  This sort of experimental philosophy can be dangerous, though, and I suspect 
that such studies, rather than telling us anything about underlying mental 
mechanisms, may instead often tell us more about how subjects respond to bizarre 
questions and scenarios. In particular, the value obtained by the systematic 
manipulation of variables in such contexts  —  especially when this is done within-
subjects  —  is offset by a cost: such designs may end up introducing task demands 
that can easily lead to misinterpretations of the data. To take a concrete example, 
one experimental study of ﬁ   ssion cases (  Rips   et al.  , 2006  ) had subjects judge 
whether an object was the same individual after it was described as undergoing a 
bizarre procedure in which it was destroyed, but a sophisticated computer then 
reproduced a copy. In these examples, the researchers varied  —  within subjects  —
  the percentage of molecules of the object that were described as having been 
perfectly copied from the original. When later asked to judge whether the copy © 2007 The Author
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(or in other cases which of two copies) was the same individual as the original 
object, they found that the subjects  ’   answers were systematically affected by the 
percentage of identical molecules: more of the same molecules, more likely to be 
the same individual. They concluded that such experiments   ‘  provide evidence 
about which of the experimental factors affect decisions about individual identity  ’   
(p. 11)  —  but I doubt this is so. Naïve subjects in such experiments are forced to 
make   some   response, but what are they to do if they are simply bafﬂ  ed by the 
questions, or if they have no strong intuitions? In this case, they grasp for the 
obvious variable that is being manipulated across trials, and use that to structure 
their answers in a systematic way  —  even though this may not reﬂ  ect any true 
judgments about identity. Indeed, there are great task demands in such experiments 
to respond in this manner  —  i.e. to make use of a salient manipulation; to do 
otherwise in such cases would often require giving an identical indeterminate 
answer on each and every trial of the experiment, and there is always implicit 
pressure against doing this. This is one way in which such examples of   ‘  experimental 
philosophy  ’   can tell us more about heuristic getting-through-the-experiment 
strategies than about actual metaphysical intuitions. 
  In contrast, note that the experimental work described in the previous sections 
is not   ‘  experimental philosophy  ’   in the methodological sense, and that each of 
these experiments uses more implicit response measures that help to ensure that 
the results reﬂ  ect underlying mental mechanisms of object persistence. In any case, 
the connections I wish to draw here between philosophical and psychological 
work on object persistence are very different from those noted above. While it is 
true that these connections may sometimes help to heuristically motivate new 
experiments (e.g.   Hall, 1998; Rips   et al.  , 2006  )    3     or interpretations of experiments 
(  Xu, 1997  ), I will focus instead on how psychological mechanisms of object 
persistence (especially relevant parts of mid-level visual object processing) may 
interact with philosophical intuitions in the ﬁ  rst place.   
    5.2 Origins of Metaphysical Intuitions 
  On its face, the philosophical project of analyzing object persistence seems to be a 
completely different type of investigation than the empirical project of determining 
how persisting object representations are constructed in the visual system. One is 
about considered judgment and about the world itself, while the other is about our 
experience of the world. I think there is a deeper link between these projects, 
though, and this link turns on the use of intuitions as   ‘  data  ’   in philosophical 
theorizing. Philosophy can easily strike empirical researchers as a curious discipline, 
        3           Of course, study of the philosophical literature could also be of heuristic use in helping to 
extend the types of studies discussed in this paper. For example, it would be relatively 
straightforward to adapt our object reviewing experiments to cases of fusion as well as ﬁ  ssion, 
and to study additional factors such as the constraint that two objects cannot be located in the 
same place at the same time (see   Mitroff, Scholl and Wynn, 2005  ).   © 2007 The Author
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because of its reliance on intuition. As noted in the opening paragraph of this paper, 
perhaps the central lesson of cognitive science has been that certain intuitions (about 
the nature and ﬁ  delity of cognitive processing) are radically mistaken, and that intuitions 
in general are a notoriously unreliable guide to how the mind actually works. Yet, 
intuitions play an extremely powerful role in constraining philosophical theorizing. 
This is obvious in projects of conceptual analysis, but in practice intuitions also seem 
to play a dominant role in ‘pure’ metaphysical theorizing about the world itself. 
  Sometimes the role of intuition is made explicit in analytic philosophy: the 
entire project is to devise a conceptual scheme which accounts for the intuitions 
in various cases. Our intuitions are not always the sole constraints in such projects  —
  since for example we may also want to test philosophical accounts for their 
coherence with other neighboring accounts of related concepts (in pursuit of 
  ‘  reﬂ  ective  equilibrium  ’  )  —  but they do play a decisive role in practice. This is 
certainly true in much (though perhaps not all) of the metaphysical theorizing 
discussed in the present paper. The most salient methodological practice in the 
philosophical literature on object persistence, at least in my reading of it, is to (1) 
create clever new puzzles and scenarios, (2) note what various theories are 
committed to saying about them, (3) note that these commitments contrast with 
our intuitions about what we   should   say in such cases, and then (4) attempt to 
revise the theories to match our intuitions. Sometimes this use of intuitions is 
made explicit. In theorizing about object persistence, for example,   ‘  [m]any 
philosophers share a deep commitment to   …   metaphysical theses that express some 
of our surest and most ﬁ  rmly held intuitions   …   . Our goal   …   should be to strike 
the best balance between achieving philosophical beauty in terms of elegant, 
coherent metaphysical theories of persistence and   matching our intuitions    ’   (  Kurtz, 
2006  , pp. 1, 15).    4     In other cases, this use of intuitions is simply apparent in practice, 
for example when a sufﬁ  cient reason to reject a theory is just that   ‘  This strikes me 
as obviously false  ’   (  Thomson, 1983  , p. 213, commenting on the claim of some 
  ‘  temporal parts  ’   theories that objects exist only momentarily, being constantly 
replaced by non-identical objects). In any case, many philosophers seem unwilling 
to simply abandon our intuitions about object persistence entirely.    5     
  In meta-philosophical discussions, there seem to be a wide range of attitudes 
toward the use of intuitions (for a representative collection of views see   DePaul 
and Ramsey, 1998  ). Some philosophers offer broad defenses of their power, in 
support of classical conceptual analysis (e.g.   Bealer, 1996, 2000  ). Others claim that 
intuition-mongering (and the conceptual analysis that it fuels) are of little use 
        4           Note, though, that it is sometimes difﬁ  cult to tell just what philosophers mean by   ‘  intuitions  ’    —
  since in some cases this term may refer to any beliefs about abstract things that are not a direct 
result of perception  —  even if those beliefs are the result of lengthy consideration by experts.   
        5           One exception, from an article entitled   ‘  Can amoebae divide without multiplying?  ’  :   ‘  [I]f we 
wish to recognize, as we should, the possibility of persistence through ﬁ  ssion,   …   we must 
swallow our intuitions, based as they are on habits of thought and speech adapted to situations 
in which such possibilities rarely, if ever, eventuate, and revert to the explicitly identity-based 
idioms of pure metaphysics  ’   (  Robinson, 1985  , p. 319).   © 2007 The Author
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except as ways of aiming empirical inquiry in useful directions (e.g.   Cummins, 
1998; Kornblith, 1998  ; see also   Stich, 1990; Weinberg, Nichols and Stich, 2001  ). 
Others take an intermediate view (e.g.   Levin, 2004  ). Regardless of how ultimately 
useful intuitions are in philosophical theorizing, though, it seems well worth asking 
about where they come from, and how they are produced. 
  I suggest that that psychological mechanisms of object persistence  —  especially 
the kinds of mid-level visual object processing reviewed above  —  may serve to 
underlie the intuitions about persistence that fuel metaphysical theories. Many 
intuitions, after all, are not appreciated in an abstract, Platonic sense, but are 
rather part of how we experience and imagine the world. Intuitions may generate 
  ‘  pull on the intellect  ’   (  Sider, 2001b  , p. 201) in some cases, but this pull may not 
have an intellectual origin (e.g. arising as a direct result of other beliefs); rather, it 
may arise because of the way our minds work. With regard to blatant violations 
of spatiotemporal continuity, for example, it may be true that   ‘  Our physical laws 
do not allow us to believe in the possibility of such spatiotemporal translations  ’   
(  Scaltsas, 1981  , p. 402). But this connection between physical laws and beliefs is 
not direct; rather, it is indirectly mediated by mental reﬂ  exes that were presumably 
ﬁ  xed during natural selection because they matched so well with the laws that 
constrain the behavior of matter in the real world. And because those laws  —  and 
the character of our environments  —  were unchanged (or even unchangeable) for 
so long during the course of our evolution, these mental habits may now be 
ﬁ  rmly entrenched in perception. In short, our intuitions about the nature of 
persisting individuals may derive from the way we   experience   the world in terms 
of persisting individuals. And those experiences may in turn arise from speciﬁ  c 
representations and mechanisms of mind  —  such as   ‘  object ﬁ  les  ’   and mid-level 
object-based visual routines  —  whose nature we can empirically determine. 
  The kind of connection I am suggesting may hold not only in   ‘  online  ’   perceptual 
experience, but also in the imagery, simulation, and tacit reasoning that accompanies 
the evaluation of philosophical puzzles. These bring online the relevant 
representations and processes  —  and they bring online memories of relevant 
experiences when those representations and processes were also operating  —  and 
these processes and memories may in turn inﬂ  uence our attitude toward the cases 
we are evaluating. Indeed, these mechanisms of mind may in some sense be 
inescapable. Because they are primitive processes  —  operating, as do many or most 
visual processes, in reﬂ  exive ways that are unswayed by our current goals and beliefs 
(see   Pylyshyn, 1999  )  —  they effectively serve as lenses through which we cannot 
help experiencing and imagining the world. Even when we formulate higher-level 
beliefs about what may be occurring in a certain scenario, for example, we may still 
not be able to help perceiving it in a different way. In the   ‘  tunnel effect  ’   described 
in Section 3, for example, we simply   see   strange events such as lemons turning into 
kiwis (  Flombaum and Scholl, 2006; Flombaum   et al.  , 2004  ; cf.   Figure    5  ) even when 
we know that cannot be really happening. As such, these experiences (  ‘  perceptual 
intuitions?  ’  ) may still   ‘  pull on the intellect  ’   despite our higher-level judgments, 
leading us to feel that certain interpretations are more or less natural. © 2007 The Author
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  This connection between psychological mechanisms of object persistence and 
philosophical intuitions about object persistence may hold in a general sense, but 
it may also help drive our intuitions in particular cases: 
  Why do we judge that spatiotemporal continuity is so intrinsic to object 
persistence (Section 2)? Perhaps because that principle is wired into how we 
experience the world in the ﬁ  rst place. In some cases we irresistibly perceive 
objects as persisting individuals because of their spatiotemporally continuous 
trajectories, or we ﬁ  nd ourselves unable to track objects as persisting individuals 
because they violate spatiotemporal continuity (  Cheries   et al.  , 2005; Scholl and 
Feigenson, 2004; Scholl and Pylyshyn, 1999  ;   Spelke   et al.  , 1995  ). Because this 
principle is part of how we process object tracking in the ﬁ  rst place, our minds 
may simply not have the ingredients or experiences that would allow us to imagine 
persistence in its absence. There might be philosophical reasons for wanting to do 
so, but everything about our experiences with persisting objects in the world will 
pull on the intellect in the opposite direction. 
  Why do we judge that objects continue to exist despite changes to their 
properties (Section 3)? Perhaps because our visual   representations   of objects persist 
through property changes. These representations  —    ‘  object ﬁ  les  ’    —  may store and 
update visual features, but they are controlled primarily (or even solely) by 
spatiotemporal factors (  Flombaum and Scholl, 2006; Flombaum   et al.  , 2004; 
Kahneman   et al.  , 1992; Mitroff and Alvarez, in press  ). From this perspective, the 
relevant observation is not that we   can   perceive objects as persisting despite changes 
to their features, but that we   cannot help   but see objects as persisting in some cases, 
despite changes to those properties, as in   Figure    6    —  and this is because in turn our 
visual systems are wired to represent the relevant objects via a single updated 
  ‘  object ﬁ  le  ’   representation. This   ‘  representational persistence  ’   in mid-level visual 
cognition may then in turn fuel our intuitions about actual metaphysical persistence 
in the world itself. Endurance theories of persistence, for example, may simply 
strike many readers as much more natural and compelling than perdurance or 
exdurance theories because endurance theories are more closely matched to the 
actual way in which we experience the world. (It may be a metaphysical question 
whether an object persists over time in a given scenario, but it is an increasingly 
tractable empirical question whether the object in that scenario would be 
represented by the same online visual representation over time  —  though our 
laboratory, at least, has not yet managed to procure a Star Trek transporter.) 
Philosophers may think, for example, that they are preferring an endurance theory 
because   ‘  a number of our practices and forms of self-understanding depend on the 
idea that there are enduring things  ’   (  Haslanger, 2003  , p. 351)  —  but I suggest that 
what many of these   ‘  practices  ’   and   ‘  forms of self-understanding  ’   may come down 
to in practice are the results of the mental machinery we have that is devoted to 
computing enduring representations of objects over time. 
  Finally, why do we judge that cohesion violations are so likely to disrupt object 
persistence, as in ﬁ  ssion examples? Perhaps because these very cohesion violations, 
when they are actually experienced,   do   disrupt our persisting object representations © 2007 The Author
Journal compilation © 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
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(  Cheries   et al.  , in press  )  —  or at least give rise to considerable costs in perceptual 
processing (  Mitroff   et al.  , 2004  ). In contrast, more complicated ﬁ  ssion examples 
such as the Ship of Theseus (as discussed in Section 4) seem to leave us intuitively 
adrift: when many people contemplate such examples, there just seems to be a 
breakdown in judgment. The   ‘  renovated  ’   ship seems to be the same object in 
some ways, but the   ‘  scavenged  ’   ship seems like the same object in other ways. 
What  ’  s going on here? This might be a case where conﬂ  icting intuitions arise due 
to judgments in different parts of the mind (see   Nichols, 2004  ). Perceptual 
simulation might continue to suggest that the renovated ship is the Ship of Theseus, 
because if you were to watch it sail around while any particular renovation was 
occurring, you would represent it via the same object ﬁ  le. More abstract judgments 
based on brute similarity or origin might still  —  and at the same time  —  suggest to 
you that the scavenged ship is the Ship of Theseus, though, since the parts of your 
mind that generate these judgments are distinct from those parts that are cleaving 
to spatiotemporal continuity.   
    5.3 Judging Intuitions, and the Heuristic Nature of Perception 
  If understanding psychological mechanisms of object persistence could help us to 
understand where some metaphysical intuitions come from, then following 
through on this project could also help to fuel philosophical progress. In particular, 
if such links could be made more concrete we might gain some insight into which 
intuitions we should trust, and in what circumstances. This is true because while 
some psychological mechanisms may be reﬂ  ections of underlying physical laws, 
most are not. Psychological principles  —  including those principles that are wired 
into the visual system and that collectively constitute the   ‘  logic of perception  ’   
(  Rock, 1983  )  —  are typically fallible   heuristic   principles that get things right most of 
the time, but fail spectacularly in some special circumstances. This, for example, is 
what drives almost all visual illusions. Perception is fraught with ambiguity, and 
cannot be implemented as a type of deductive inference. Instead, the visual system 
must make assumptions about the world in order to arrive at useful percepts. Such 
assumptions  —  for example that objects are rigid and three-dimensional (e.g.   Ullman, 
1979  ), or that there is a single overhead light source (  Hershberger, 1970  )  —  can 
be wrong in certain circumstances, however, which leads to the familiar visual 
illusions of depth and lightness. In short, the visual system involves (and must 
involve) probabilitistic assumptions about the nature of the environment (see 
  Scholl, 2005  ) and thus will fail in those unusual circumstances when the assumptions 
are not satisﬁ  ed. 
  But   ‘  unusual circumstances  ’  , to say the least, is what philosophical puzzles in 
metaphysics (and beyond) seem to be all about! Such puzzles  —  with their fake 
barns, stopped watches, swampmen, and Star Trek transporter malfunctions  —  are 
deemed useful precisely because they are so unusual, and thus hopefully diagnostic 
of the relevant intuitions. In practice, this frequently causes our intuitions to lean 
in unexpected directions, which in turn puts pressure on the philosophical theories © 2007 The Author
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that do not accord with those unexpected intuitions. It is possible, though, that 
these intuitions are like visual illusions: they are simply   mistakes   brought on by the 
unusual circumstances, giving us the wrong answer. This will be hard to diagnose 
conceptually, though: such intuitions may seem just as compelling as those based 
on more pedestrian cases, just as a visual illusion of depth is no less compelling than 
a percept of actual depth. 
  This analysis might seem to lead us to question the use of such outlandish 
examples in cases involving object persistence (e.g.   Gendler, 1998, 2002  , in press 
b). The outlandishness per se may not be problematic, but these scenarios may 
violate assumptions about the world that are made in a reﬂ   exive way by our 
perceptual and cognitive processes. This is consistent with previous discussions of 
the danger of such thought experiments. For example:   ‘  [C]ertain patterns of 
features that coincide only fortuitously may none the less play a central role in the 
organization of our concepts. To the extent that imaginary scenarios involve 
disruptions of these patterns, our ﬁ  rst-order judgments about them may be distorted 
or even inverted  ’   (  Gendler, 2002  , p. 34). And on ﬁ  ssion cases in particular:   ‘  Fission 
cases simply conﬁ  rm   …   what all of us   …   already know: the facts that inform our 
everyday judgments of identity over time are such that it is broadly logically 
possible that they lead us astray, or simply fail to lead us  ’   (  Merricks, 1997  , p. 180). 
In summary, a philosophical intuition that is fueled in part by mechanisms of visual 
cognition may be suspect, at least to the extent that it involves contexts in which 
those perceptual mechanisms generate incorrect interpretations. Such perceptual 
illusions may, in the service of metaphysical theorizing, become cognitive illusions 
that can lead us astray.   
    5.4 Conclusions: Philosophical Progress? 
  As my philosophical colleagues are constantly reminding me, experimental 
psychology grew out of philosophy in the ﬁ   rst place. Having diverged rather 
dramatically in the intervening century, however, they are now growing closer 
again in some subtle ways. Some of this new ﬂ  irtation is due to empirical progress 
on topics that have previously resisted scientiﬁ  c  investigation  —  e.g. involving 
consciousness, or reference. And some of these new connections are also due to 
the recent injection of experimental techniques into philosophy itself (see   Knobe 
and Nichols, in press  ). These interactions are not always comfortable, though, and 
often such connections can feel threatening or deﬂ  ationary. Certainly the preceding 
discussion could be read in this way, as it questions the value of intuitions  —
  especially those derived from bizarre metaphysical scenarios. 
  I suggest, though, that the empirical study of psychological mechanisms of 
object persistence could also help drive progress in philosophy in a positive sense, 
and for just these reasons. If we can learn more about where our metaphysical 
intuitions come from, then we may be able to make more informed choices about 
which intuitions to give up when they conﬂ  ict. This could be useful, to the extent 
that philosophical theorizing requires having to favor one intuition over another. © 2007 The Author
Journal compilation © 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
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But, at least in metaphysical theorizing about object persistence, this is a very great 
extent. Indeed, the entire project of object persistence in philosophy has been 
characterized in terms of deciding which intuitions to prioritize:   ‘  [T]he real 
problem of persistence remains one of balancing trade-offs. To explain how objects 
persist   …  , we must revise and/or forfeit some of our basic intuitions  ’   (  Kurtz, 2006  , 
p. 24). In this context, understanding the origins of our metaphysical intuitions in 
various psychological mechanisms could help us understand when they are worth 
revising or forfeiting in our philosophical theories, especially if there is reason to 
think that those psychological mechanisms may yield unreliable results in the 
particular contexts in which they are being asked to operate. (If, for example, a 
theory of persistence demands that we give up the intuition that property changes 
involve true alteration of persisting objects, then we may be comforted to know that 
the reason we have that intuition in the ﬁ  rst place is not because of any intellectual 
obligations due to other beliefs, but only because in visual experience we represent 
property changes by altering persisting   representations   of objects.) In general, 
understanding where metaphysical intuitions come from is one way that psychology 
might usefully contribute to philosophy, rather than trying to replace it.           
              Department of Psychology 
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